{"id":80186,"date":"2021-05-13T06:00:19","date_gmt":"2021-05-13T04:00:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/blog-post\/why-huaweis-norm-shaping-shows-that-switzerlands-china-strategy-matters\/"},"modified":"2026-05-27T11:21:52","modified_gmt":"2026-05-27T09:21:52","slug":"why-huaweis-norm-shaping-shows-that-switzerlands-china-strategy-matters","status":"publish","type":"blog-post","link":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/blog-post\/why-huaweis-norm-shaping-shows-that-switzerlands-china-strategy-matters\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Huawei\u2019s norm-shaping shows that Switzerland\u2019s China strategy matters"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

T<\/em>he political influence activities of the Chinese Party-State are currently a controversial subject in Switzerland and beyond. It became increasingly clear that traditional concepts of international relations do not really fit China\u2019s diplomatic strategies. This blog outlines the concept of sharp power which aims at improving our understanding of China\u2019s foreign policy, notably through the role of private companies like Huawei.\u00a0<\/i><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is eager to present China as a prosperous and peaceful country built on a rich history and culture. This charm offensive includes, for instance, hosting the Olympic games, investing in cultural exchanges, and offering generous scholarships for foreign students. In essence, the aim is to project a positive image of the country and its leadership. As all these efforts being non-coercive, it has been argued to be a form of soft power<\/a>. In that perspective, the CCP would strive to win the \u201chearts and minds\u201d around the world. Until here, the Chinese efforts do not differ from other countries\u2019 public diplomacy endeavours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, a closer look into the Chinese strategies makes clear that it is about others \u201cthinking right\u201d rather than \u201cthinking well\u201d. Indeed, while China has traditional hard power resources at its disposal \u2014and does not hesitate to use them in its neighborhood\u2014 the influence attempts on the international stage are characterized by discourse manipulation and management. Either way, the CCP\u2019s soft power is not working<\/a> \u2013 at least not in \u2018the West\u2019. Against this backdrop, it has been argued that the Chinese strategy is not about \u201cwinning hearts and minds\u201d, but rather about being perceived as a great power that shapes opinions on the international stage. The National Endowment for Democracy<\/i> calls this strategy \u201csharp power<\/a>\u201d. In contrast to soft power, which emphasizes voluntariness and attraction, authoritarian influence activities are sharp in the sense that they seek to manipulate target audiences and manage information. Thus, the CCP exports its authoritarian system into the international discourse and aims, eventually, to portray the own system as an alternative to democratic systems. By the continuous sharp power efforts by the CCP, the systemic value differences between \u2018the West\u2019 and China are moved to the background while trade and business relations are depoliticized and depicted as \u2018mutually beneficial\u2019. In fact, sharp power contains a security dimension. The recently published Swiss Security Policy Report<\/a> does not speak of sharp power, but it outlines disinformation and influence activities as serious risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this regard, China is an active and accepted member of several international organizations, where its representatives often try \u2013 sometimes offensively, sometimes subtly \u2013 to undermine global norms built on liberal values. Known examples are found in the fields of human rights<\/a> or global internet governance<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the characteristics of sharp power is its exertion through a frayed network<\/a> of state agencies, groups, companies, or individuals. An example from Huawei underlines how companies assist the CCP in managing the international discourse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Human rights are a standard disclaimer in corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. Hence, I had a look at Huawei \u2013 arguably one of the most controversial Chinese companies \u2013 and its European competitor Ericsson. Huawei did not refer to the term \u201chuman rights\u201d in its\u00a0 2015 report<\/a>. Ericsson in contrast, referred 130 times to \u201chuman rights\u201d, although their report<\/a> is some 40 pages shorter. Similar things in Huawei\u2019s 2019 report<\/a>: the company indeed referred to human rights. However, the term \u201cfundamental rights\u201d, as used in the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights<\/a>,\u00a0 is replaced with \u201cbasic rights\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While rather subtle in the abovementioned example, Huawei\u2019s careful choice of words helps to undermine the universal meaning of human rights. Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that the CCP\u2019s agenda and international disclosures are not always compatible. Thus, Huawei\u2019s ambiguity of human rights might be a strategy to align its business strategy with both \u2013 the CCP\u2019s agenda and international standards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, in order to better understand those challenges and how to counter them, Switzerland and other countries have to build up more expertise on China\u2019s politico-economic system and its sharp power. The recently published China Strategy<\/a> is a first, but little, step towards this goal. On the one hand, the strategy emphasizes the importance of expertise. On the other hand, the Swiss strategy is conceived as \u201cindependent\u201d from alliances such as the EU, which seems illusory in the long run. The notion of western solidarity has already been challenged as the US and the EU imposed sanctions<\/a> against China because of the human rights situation in Xinjiang. Switzerland<\/a> is now pressured to go along. Examples from Norway<\/a> or Australia<\/a> show that bilateral opposition towards the CCP is hopeless. Thus, to effectively defend fundamental rights and to reinvigorate the liberal system, regional and multilateral alliances are needed. Although this seems politically na\u00efve at this point in time, there should not be a \u201cSwiss\u201d or a \u201cDutch\u201d China strategy, but a \u201cEuropean\u201d one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Considering the events in Xinjiang, or Hong Kong, criticisms of the Chinese Party-State are more important than ever. Yet, those critics must be carefully framed to avoid falling into Sinophobic discourses. A critical standpoint towards the Party-State does not equate with critics towards Chinese people in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cover picture by Manoj kumar kasirajanon on <\/i>Unsplash<\/i><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":79282,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false},"archive-status":[],"region":[],"custom-themes":[1823],"class_list":["post-80186","blog-post","type-blog-post","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","custom-themes-volkerrecht-multilateralismus"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/blog-post\/80186","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/blog-post"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/blog-post"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/79282"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=80186"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"archive-status","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/archive-status?post=80186"},{"taxonomy":"region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/region?post=80186"},{"taxonomy":"custom-themes","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/custom-themes?post=80186"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}