{"id":87913,"date":"2026-10-28T08:00:00","date_gmt":"2026-10-28T07:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/?post_type=blog-post&p=87913"},"modified":"2026-10-27T08:44:06","modified_gmt":"2026-10-27T07:44:06","slug":"swifts-monopoly-might-fall-apart-a-toolbox-on-how-switzerland-can-preclude-fragmentation","status":"publish","type":"blog-post","link":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/blog-post\/swifts-monopoly-might-fall-apart-a-toolbox-on-how-switzerland-can-preclude-fragmentation\/","title":{"rendered":"Swift\u2019s monopoly might fall apart \u2013 a toolbox on how Switzerland can preclude fragmentation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Overlooked but important <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Behind your salary from your international employer, Amazon order, or transfer to family abroad sits Swift, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. The cooperative links more than 12\u2019500 financial institutions across more than 200 countries and territories<\/a>. Importantly, Swift doesn\u2019t move any money; it moves the standardized messages<\/a> that tell banks to move money, think of WhatsApp for finance. The actual settlement happens via correspondent banks. Since behind nearly every cross-border payment lays a Swift instruction, whoever controls that messaging layer effectively controls who can pay whom. It\u2019s the world economy\u2019s messaging service and its role in geopolitics raises questions about its self-stated neutrality<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The weaponization of messaging<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a Belgium-based organization, Swift answers to Belgian and EU law. A supposedly \u201cneutral\u201d network can therefore be switched off by a vote in Brussels. In 2012, Swift disconnected over 30 Iranian banks<\/a> following EU sanctions, costing Iran nearly half its oil revenue<\/a>. In 2022, the EU ordered Swift to cut off Russian banks following the invasion of Ukraine, a move which Alexandra Vacroux of Harvard University and Kyiv School of Economics dubbed the \u201cnuclear option<\/a>\u201d in comparison to its alternative measures to punish Russia.\u00a0
How did the targeted nations react? Russia created its alternative to Swift, SPFS<\/a>, in 2014, following the annexation of Crimea and subsequent threats of exclusion from Swift; China launched CIPS<\/a> in 2015 to internationalize the yuan and de-dollarize the world economy. SPFS is limited, only around 177 foreign financial<\/a> intermediaries across two dozen countries use it. Since 2024, SPFS even carries a warning by the U.S. Treasury stating that joining the service signifies a sanctions red flag. CIPS is larger than SPFS by far and growing fast (especially within BRICS) boasting over 1\u2019700 participating financial institutions<\/a> by end of 2025. Yet, CIPS isn\u2019t independent from Swift as it heavily relies on it for many of its messages and often only settles payments rather than also being a messenger.\u00a0
Ergo: Swapping a Belgian chokepoint for a Russian or Chinese one isn\u2019t decentralization and independence. It\u2019s just a different, most likely less transparent landlord. The actual cost is fragmentation: a world with regionalized payment systems in which the network you use signals the bloc you belong to.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Swiss Predictability <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Swiss National Bank sits among the G10 central banks overseeing Swift. Switzerland hosts a massive concentration of global finance streams; notably, around 50-60% of Russian oil and gas was traded via Switzerland<\/a> before the war on Ukraine. What makes Switzerland so attractive is its financial center\u2019s promise: predictability. The money routed through Switzerland is governed by transparent and stable rule of law, not impulsive politics. This is where Switzerland\u2019s dilemma becomes acute.
In February 2022, Bern adopted the EU\u2019s full sanctions package against Russia including the exclusion of Russia from the global financial system. Then Federal Council President Ignazio Cassis proclaimed, \u201cneutrality does not mean indifference<\/a>\u201d. Every time the West uses Swift as leverage with Bern\u2019s compliance, it teaches more governments to build alternatives, proving that Swiss finance is no longer isolated from geopolitical pressure and thus possibly eroding its foundational trust.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, what should Switzerland do?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compliance based on facts, not emotions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a neutral G10 overseer, Switzerland is uniquely positioned to push for Swift\u2019s oversight to become genuinely independent and rule bound, establishing transparent criteria for disconnection instead of ad hoc political decisions. If Swift is used as a geopolitical instrument, this should at least be done in a predictable way which respects formalized processes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defend interoperability<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Common technical standards like ISO 20022, a multi part open international standard in communication between financial intermediaries, should be expanded. This way, competing systems can remain compatible and thus prevent fragmentation of systems by blocs. As ISO has its seat in Geneva, Bern could build bridges between the different financial messaging systems and states by using Switzerland\u2019s key strength: bringing A and B to the table and finding solutions.
Lastly, Switzerland should be honest about the trade-off: When Switzerland aligns with sanctions, it should do so through clear, consistent legal criteria rather than case-by-case improvisation when following the EU or the US. This way Switzerland could preserve its predictability that makes it a trusted financial hub.
We must be aware that Switzerland cannot halt the weaponization of systems underlying the international financial market. But with its international reputation and historic involvement with Swift<\/a>, Switzerland is better placed than almost anyone to insist that the world\u2019s financial plumbing remains a shared utility and not anyone\u2019s political instrument.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":87914,"template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":true},"archive-status":[],"region":[],"custom-themes":[1822],"class_list":["post-87913","blog-post","type-blog-post","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","custom-themes-finanz-wirtschaftspolitik"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/blog-post\/87913","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/blog-post"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/blog-post"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/87914"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=87913"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"archive-status","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/archive-status?post=87913"},{"taxonomy":"region","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/region?post=87913"},{"taxonomy":"custom-themes","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foraus.ch\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/custom-themes?post=87913"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}