The liberal order the United States once built is now being challenged by the U.S. itself. Washington no longer acts as the guardian of a rule-based system but as its most powerful dissident, driven by strategic self-preservation rather than universal ideals. For Switzerland and other small-to-medium powers, this shift calls for a new kind of diplomacy: one rooted in legitimacy, pluralism, and genuine multilateral reform.
From policeman…
The liberal world order is an American creation. After 1945, the United States placed itself at the centre of a global system designed to control the world and prevent the return of total war. The United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and later the World Trade Organization all reflected the same idea: common rules should govern relations between states. From the 1980s and for almost 30 years, the U.S. acted as the Leviathan of Hobbesian theory: architect, judge, and policeman. Its leadership was achieved through strength and legitimised by prosperity and relative stability.
The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the triumph of liberalism, but not the “end of history.” The war on terror, the 2008 financial crash, and the pandemic gradually fractured the Western consensus. Meanwhile, China’s rise, the growth of the Global South, and the return of assertive regional powers weakened the universality of the liberal project.
… to partisan
Political theorist Carl Schmitt described the partisan as the challenger of the established order – the actor who fights outside existing rules, driven by ideology and existential urgency. Today, the United States increasingly acts not as the guardian of that order but as its most powerful partisan.
This new U.S. stance was well summarised by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio earlier this year: “The post-war global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us.”
America’s strategic rebellion
Recent years have shown a growing impatience with multilateral constraints. Withdrawals from treaties and international organisations, trade wars with China, bilateral free trade agreements (FDA) struck outside regional frameworks, and the pursuit of peace agreements brokered outside UN mechanisms – such as the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan – are all signs of one thing: becoming a partisan is not a tactical move or a temporary policy shift. It is a revolution in America’s vision and strategy.
The costs and risks of hegemonic leadership have convinced U.S. policymakers that the era of global guardianship is over. In this context, acting “above the law” or “outside the law” becomes almost the same. Washington is shifting toward a posture of strategic retrenchment, backed by broad domestic and bipartisan support for preserving privilege and defending its position.
For medium powers, understanding this shift early is crucial. It is not an emergency to be managed until the next administration; it is a long-term realignment that will shape the coming decades.
How Switzerland should respond
The post-war world order remains the best framework for small-medium states to be heard, to advance their policies, and to protect their interests and sovereignty. Can it exist without a policeman? Yes, but only if it is reformed. Chasing the departing hegemon may work in the short term, until the “policeman” turns around and strikes, as seen with Trump’s 39% tariffs on Swiss goods.
In a world without a single hegemon, legitimacy must replace coercion. Switzerland should therefore champion a renewed multilateralism, one that includes the Global South, embraces reform from within, and creates space for all voices in the emerging world system.
Establishing true multilateralism through pluralism
Switzerland could diversify its partnerships beyond the Western sphere by deepening economic cooperation with Asian partners such as Singapore and Indonesia on green finance and innovation, while strengthening development collaboration with Kenya and Chile on governance and climate adaptation. These differentiated ties would reinforce Switzerland’s role as a pragmatic bridge between regions and economic platforms.
At the same time, true multilateralism must manage not only conflicting interests but also conflicting values. Switzerland should keep actively supporting ongoing initiatives for UN reform, such as the ACT Group, while also exploring a broader understanding of human rights, as promoted by the Human Rights 75 Initiative by OHCHR.
In this spirit, Switzerland could institutionalise an annual forum on “Values and Interests in Global Governance”, hosted in Geneva and bringing together representatives from the Global South, civil society, academia, and the private sector. The goal would be to identify pragmatic common ground and shared fundamental values, without imposing a single Western narrative. By defending value pluralism and rules over force, Switzerland can help turn today’s global disorder into the foundation of a renewed order.
In that sense, fostering multilateralism is not nostalgia for the past; it is an investment in the world to come.
