Regional strategies of the Federal Council provide an opportunity to question the relevance and manner in which a country structures its foreign policy. By resorting to an essentially continental approach, might we be overlooking more pertinent frameworks? To illustrate our intuition, we use the example of Tanzania to explore whether Swiss perceptions and objectives regarding this country would change if we placed it within a framework of an Indo-Pacific strategy rather than a sub-Saharan one.
Regional and continental strategies: a subjective division?
Between 2019 and 2020, the Federal Council drafted five regional strategies for 2021-2024, which set its foreign policy objectives and apply its four main principles: peace and security, prosperity, sustainability, and digitization. The Federal council has renewed these strategies for 2024-2027.
These “regions” correspond to continents or sub-continents (East Asia, America, MENA, etc.). The maps used are centered on landmasses.
Such regional segmentation is, in our view, relevant: countries within the same region share similar situations, populations with similar cultures, and common challenges. This approach allows Switzerland to focus its actions on common needs within these regions.
Furthermore, the Federal Council takes a nuanced approach: for example, regarding the African continent, it has not adopted a strategy for “Africa” but rather “Sub-Saharan Africa” and “MENA,” recognizing that Morocco is closer to Jordan than to Namibia.
Such segmentation may involve biases: some countries may benefit from being in particular groups or strategies. We hypothesize that Tanzania is disadvantaged by this segmentation (see below).
Oceanic approach and Indo-Pacific: a framework for understanding in the 21st century
We note that international organizations and researchers propose an oceanic approach of the world, as historian Fernand Braudeldid in 1949: “The Mediterranean as a human unit is the combination over an area of route networks and urban centres, lines of force and nodal points.”
Following this line of thought, the concept of the Indo-Pacific has become significant in the 21st century. The Indo-Pacific includes the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as the surrounding lands. It extends from the eastern coast of Africa to the western coasts of the Americas. This concept was popularized by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in 2007 and later endorsed by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2021, when he appointed an ambassador for the region. China, India, and the United States also have their own strategies. The Indo-Pacific is not addressed in the Swiss strategy for sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, it structures the continent into sub-regions, country groups, and organizations: Sahel, Horn of Africa, Great Lakes, “Lionesses,” and regional organizations.
From one region to another, the Tanzanian example and its strategic consequences
We choose the example of Tanzania because we suppose that the country is disadvantaged by this strategy, even though it is Switzerland’s fifth partner in sub-Saharan Africa.
Tanzania has a long history in the Indo-Pacific. Its coast—including Zanzibar—corresponds to 1,424 kilometers of the western shore of the Indo-Pacific. Its ports have historically facilitated trade across this space with the Arab Empires—giving this coast the name “Swahili”—as well as Persian, Indian, and Chinese empires. These exchanges are reflected in the example of a Chinese paintingfrom 1415 depicting a giraffe.
In the Swiss strategy, Tanzania is classified within the “Great Lakes” region, which is described as: “[…] marked for decades by internal and cross-border conflicts and tensions, caused by economic, ethnic, historical, and (socio-)political factors as well as access to natural resources.”
However, Tanzania is a peaceful country with a lower-middle-income level and does not suffer from regional instability. Placed within an Indo-Pacific strategy, Tanzania would be alongside Kenya, Oman, India, Pakistan, China, and Indonesia, which are already its main trading partners.
Regarding the four aforementioned principles, the shift in perspective could redefine the actions Switzerland could undertake. On peace and security, Tanzania aligns with the stable countries mentioned above. The focus is on maritime security rather than the conflicts of the Great Lakes in which it is not involved. On prosperity, Tanzanian ports are seen in connection with other ports in the Indo-Pacific region (Mumbai, Colombo, or Singapore) rather than merely as continental outlets, enhancing economic development and port infrastructure. On sustainability, Tanzania is associated with the preservation and utilization of coastal resources and maritime transport in the Indo-Pacific (consistent with Goal 14 of the UN’s 2030 Agenda). Switzerland would support this in addition to its current commitment to the raw materials sector. Finally, on digitization, in the face of Indo-Pacific technical leaders like Japan, India, or Singapore, adding a focus on digitization in Tanzania in the strategy appears necessary to highlight the importance of digital harmonization among Indo-Pacific states. For instance, the French Indo-Pacific strategy delegates the task of drawing up harmonization standards to the European Union.
Conclusion
Given the observed elements, we conclude that a country, exemplified here by Tanzania, may be disadvantaged by the Federal Council’s continental strategy segmentation. On this specific case, we advocate for the establishment of an “Indo-Pacific” strategy—or alternatively, the addition of a chapter in the next sub-Saharan Africa strategy. With the end of the Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy in 2024, the time is ripe to integrate this approach. More generally, we ask ourselves: Do such geographical divisions truly influence a country’s foreign policy?
