On December 13th, 2024, the Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling requiring the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) to re-examine the request for consular protection submitted by Daniel D., a former Islamic State (IS) fighter detained by Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. Citing ill-treatment and threats to his life, Daniel D. seeks to be repatriated to Switzerland. The ruling gives us this opportunity to address the broader question of Swiss ‘jihad-motivated travelers’ or ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ (FTFs): should Switzerland repatriate them?
A Small Number of Swiss FTFs still Detained in Syria
78 Swiss citizens are estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the IS between 2011 and 2024. Following the fall of the IS caliphate (2019), some of these FTFs were captured by Kurdish armed forces. According to the FDFA, three Swiss men and one woman, with her child, are currently detained in camps run by Kurdish authorities in northeastern Syria.
A Very Strict Swiss Policy
Switzerland’s policy on repatriation of FTFs was clearly outlined in 2019: no active repatriation of adults and a selective repatriation of minors (without their mothers). Compared to other European policies – ranging from proactive repatriation (Western Balkans) to selective repatriation, often including both children and their mothers (France, Germany and Denmark) – Switzerland, like Austria until recently, has maintained a highly restrictive policy.
The Case Against Repatriation: Domestic Security, Control and Moral Self-Accountability
The prioritization of the security of the Swiss population over individual interests (those of FTFs) is the main concern underpinning this 2019-strategy. This concern is particularly legitimate as some FTFs are suspected of having planned terrorist acts on Swiss territory.
Preventing ‘uncontrolled returns’ and ensuring that FTFs do not remain unpunished are central to this 2019-strategy.
Alongside this legal and security rationale, statements by representatives of the FDFA refer to a moral self-accountability of FTFs: ‘We don’t want the state to bring these people back (…) because they are a danger to the population. They are indeed left to fend for themselves in the situation they have gotten themselves into.’
The Case in Favor of Repatriation: Absence of Trial and Detention Conditions
However, Switzerland’s position is challenged by two legal arguments: FTFs detained in Syria have not been tried and have been held for years in overcrowded detention camps or prisons, facing unsanitary conditions, ill-treatment and malnutrition. These conditions have led to a number of casualties. In addition, the detainees are exposed to Turkish airstrikes.
In 2021, a group of 15 UN-mandated experts sent a letter to 57 countries, including Switzerland, urging them to repatriate FTFs and their families. Countries indeed have obligations towards their citizens abroad, particularly when fundamental rights are at risk. For children, the experts’ stance is unequivocal: under international treaties, their rights take precedence over almost everything else. They should neither be kept in war zones nor separated from their parents.
… and a Nuanced Security Perspective
Intuitively, the rationale ‘the farther away, the safer’ seems valid. But a return home does not equate to impunity or lack of control. The repatriation of FTFs allows for direct control over their situation, detention conditions (if applicable), and rehabilitation (deradicalization). Potentially, having them close would allow to yield valuable intelligence for counterterrorism efforts.
Other security arguments in favor of repatriation include the risk of radicalization of children in the detention camps (as a prime target for IS partisans) and the potential uncontrolled liberation of FTFs in case of a larger Turkish military interventions against Kurdish armed forces. It is far from guaranteed that the FTFs would then no longer pose a threat.
Controlled Repatriation
Both International Humanitarian Law principles and security concerns argue in favor of controlled repatriation or, at the very least, a proactive reassessment of the remaining detained FTFs and their families in Syria.
A controlled repatriation must be associated with a rehabilitation program. A structured process should include a comprehensive initial (mental) health assessment (as seen in Kosovo), multi-institutional collaboration and coordination (involving law enforcement officers, family members, and social workers), and synergies with violent extremism prevention initiatives. For instance, leveraging the expertise of a network such as the Swiss Security Network could be beneficial.
Conclusion
While the small number of Swiss FTFs still detained in Syria may seem anecdotal, their cases are emblematic of the tendency towards ‘rushed’ decision-making when dealing with terrorism. They underscore the shortcomings of a rigid approach to counterterrorism, advocating a framework that respects legal obligations and embraces a forward-thinking security strategy. Admittedly, such an approach does require political courage – and the willingness to educate the public about it.
