The deterioration of the international security situation prompts Switzerland to deepen cooperation with international organizations and partners. While the Swiss government does not question the compatibility of this approach with the policy of neutrality, a domestic initiative has been launched to enshrine a stricter definition of neutrality within the Constitution.
The Federal Council opposes this move, arguing that the policy of neutrality must remain adaptable. This blog post explores how evolving security cooperation is reviving the debate on the meaning and role of Swiss neutrality today.
16.juin 2025
In a shifting international landscape marked by renewed geopolitical tensions, Switzerland is progressively reorienting its security policy towards greater international engagement. Since joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1996 and the United Nations in 2002, the country has deepened its multilateral involvement. At the multilateral level, through its membership in the UN Security Council (2023–2024) and its upcoming presidency of the OSCE in 2026.
At the military level, Switzerland also participates in certain NATO-led exercises, has joined Germany’s European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) in April 2024, and invests in interoperable defense systems.
These decisions are not accidental; they reflect a calculated response to the increasing complexity of global threats. Yet they also raise a key question: is this international cooperation still compatible with Swiss neutrality? The Federal Council maintains that it is. In contrast, a new popular initiative launched in April 2024 by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and its allies seeks to enshrine a stricter interpretation of neutrality within the Constitution, aiming to curtail such developments. The divergence underscores the absence of a shared understanding among political parties regarding the definition of Swiss neutrality policy and its application in today’s international context, despite its long-standing role as a cornerstone of foreign policy.
Switzerland’s internationalisation of its security policy is a response to strategic, financial, and military realities. In a world where threats are increasingly transnational and technologies interdependent, no country can defend itself in isolation. This was clearly expressed by Jacques Pitteloud, Swiss Ambassador to Belgium and NATO, who declared in April 2025: “An autonomous defense is an illusion, especially when it comes to technology and investment.”
Recent decisions illustrate this shift. In 2024, Switzerland joined two EU PESCO projects, invested in Patriot missile systems, and purchased F-35 fighter jets. In addition, a strategic report presented in June 2024, drafted by an external expert commission appointed by the Federal Department of Defence, recommended closer cooperation with NATO and enhanced military interoperability.
These steps are logical, according to Jacques Pitteloud, who believes the security threat in Europe will persist for a long time and that Switzerland cannot afford to remain on the margins of developments promoting armed interoperability in Europe.
Public sentiment appears to support this pragmatic direction. According to the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zürich, 53% of Swiss respondents were in favor of closer ties with NATO in 2023. This support, along with the government’s evolving strategic posture, suggests that neutrality is being adapted to ensure Switzerland remains secure and sovereign in an increasingly uncertain world.
Despite broad political consensus on neutrality as a cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy, increased international cooperation has sparked domestic concern. First, the 2024 security policy report commissioned by the DDPS triggered political tensions across the spectrum, from the left to the right. In addition, the popular initiative launched by the SVP to enshrine a stricter definition of neutrality in the Constitution, beyond Articles 173 and 185, has reignited the legal debate. Its proponents accuse the government of undermining neutrality through growing international cooperation and call for a return to a more rigid and isolationist stance. The proposed amendment would modify Article 54 on Foreign Relations by prohibiting Switzerland from joining any military or defensive alliance (except in the event of a direct attack), restricting participation in non-military coercive measures such as sanctions, except when required by the UN or to prevent circumvention and finally defining neutrality as “perpetual and armed”.
The Federal Council has rejected the initiative, warning that such a fixed definition would limit foreign policy flexibility. In its official message to Parliament and on its website, it reaffirmed that the policy of neutrality is not a static legal norm, unlike the law of neutrality, which is codified in the Hague Conventions of 18 October 1907, but a foreign policy instrument that must adapt to evolving international conditions. Over time, terms like integral, dynamic, and more recently cooperative have been used to describe its evolving nature. This flexibility is what allows Switzerland to pursue a credible security policy while remaining militarily non-aligned, as clearly stated by the Federal Council in its seminal 1993 report on neutrality.
Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis echoed this view in a 2022 interview: “Neutrality must not be rebuilt, but continually built.”
This blog post recalls that the Swiss neutrality policy is not currently governed by binding legal norms, but rather shaped by context and evolving international circumstances.
The internationalisation of Swiss security policy has reignited domestic debate over how neutrality should be defined and applied. The popular initiative to enshrine a stricter legal definition of neutrality in the Constitution would mark a significant departure from the current approach. If accepted, it would notably reduce the government’s room for maneuver and require a redefinition of Switzerland’s foreign and security policy.
