This article explores three potential security cooperation strategies for Switzerland involving the OSCE, EU, and NATO. It argues that prioritising cooperative security through the OSCE, while selectively engaging in military cooperation with the EU and NATO, best aligns with Switzerland’s long-term security interests.
“On November 20, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited Estonia to discuss the security situation in Europe with Estonian leaders” by Estonian Foreign Ministry is licensed under CC BY 2.0.
Adapting to a Shifting Order
The European security architecture, established after the Second World War, has created decades of peace across the continent through a balance of cooperative security and deterrence. However, the war in Ukraine has diminished the role of cooperative security, shifting the focus toward rearmament and military strength. In response, Switzerland is adapting to these evolving security dynamics. This adaptation is evident in the Federal Council’s recent approval of Swiss participation in two EU PESCO projects and the publication of the security policy recommendations report. In the report, the study commission argues for greater security collaboration between Switzerland and organisations like the UN, EU, and NATO. However, the OSCE, based on the concept of cooperative security, is mentioned only briefly. This raises important questions: What security strategies should Switzerland adopt in the near future? How can Switzerland position itself effectively within the European security architecture?
Reviving Cooperative Security through the OSCE
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), a key institution in cooperative security, faces challenges in managing the growing divide between Russia and the political West. Nevertheless, cooperative security has historically been instrumental in maintaining peace and freedom across Europe. With its neutral stance, Switzerland is well-suited to reinforce this framework even in uncertain times. For example, Switzerland chaired the OSCE in 2014, playing an important role in implementing the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in the Donbas region. Reassuming the OSCE chairmanship in the coming years could provide Switzerland with an opportunity to focus on rebuilding dialogue between Russia and the political West.
In the near future, European security efforts will primarily focus on deterring Russia, the aggressor in the war in Ukraine. However, the war will eventually end, most likely with a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine. In such a scenario, Switzerland would be ideally positioned to offer support in monitoring compliance, drawing on its experience as a mediator in various conflicts. Switzerland already initiated a peace process with the Summit on Peace in Ukraine. Negotiating a ceasefire, however, requires a small dialogue format in which trust can be built between the parties. If a ceasefire agreement is reached between Ukraine and Russia, Switzerland should support its implementation and monitoring through the OSCE by providing experts and financial assistance.
Increasing Engagement with EU Security Initiatives
Simultaneously, Switzerland could deepen its engagement with EU security initiatives. The recent approval of Swiss participation in PESCO’s Cyber Ranges Federation project, and in the Military Mobility project highlights an increasing willingness to collaborate with the EU in this area. Additionally, Switzerland’s planned participation in the European Skyshield Initiative (ESSI) will enable it to contribute to and benefit from a collective air defence system aimed at protecting European airspace. However, closer alignment with EU military efforts could challenge Switzerland’s perceptions of neutrality. Increased involvement may be perceived by certain actors, particularly Russia, as a shift toward Western military power, potentially undermining Switzerland’s position as a neutral state.
Strategic Cooperation with NATO
Switzerland’s neutrality policy prevents it from becoming a full NATO member due to Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty. Nevertheless, strategic cooperation through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), has been in place since 1996. The current cooperation agreement called the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP) sets out to strengthen interoperability, for example in the air force or in communications systems. Recent Swiss participation in NATO’s Tiger Meet exercises in Germany highlights growing military collaboration, signalling a shift toward increased military readiness.
Should Switzerland even consider NATO membership? While countries, like Sweden and Finland, have recently abandoned neutrality to join NATO, Switzerland would face unique challenges. Abandoning neutrality would undermine one of Switzerland’s most valuable soft power assets, limiting its role as a mediator and reducing its diplomatic influence. For now, Switzerland should continue to balance its strategic cooperation with NATO while maintaining its neutral status.
Switzerland’s Dual Approach with a Stronger Focus on Cooperative Security
The argumentation shows that Switzerland’s future in European security should involve a dual approach: The country should prioritise cooperative security by taking a leadership role in the OSCE, enhancing its role as a mediator and peacekeeper. At the same time, it should continue selective engagement in the collective security system with institutions like the EU and NATO. The strategy reflects the foundation of decades of peace in Europe after the Second World War. This approach – focused on diplomacy and cooperation through the OSCE, coupled with some strategic military collaboration with the EU and NATO – best serves Switzerland’s long-term security interests.
