Within just a few years, China has significantly expanded its nuclear capabilities – a dramatic break with its decades-long policy of minimum deterrence.
In the summer of 2021, US researchers announced that satellite imagery had uncovered at least 250 previously unknown long-range missile silos under construction in China’s interior. Previously, Beijing had only 20 such facilities.
When China entered the exclusive club of nuclear powers with its first nuclear weapons test on 16 October 1964, this path was far from predetermined. China chose a strategy of minimal deterrence and No First Use (NFU) policy: A small but credible second-strike capability would suffice for deterrence. Moreover, China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons.
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Over the past decade, Western capitals have increasingly recognized the implications of China’s rise on the world stage, yet its expanding nuclear arsenal has received relatively little notice.
Meanwhile, China’s nuclear armament is progressing rapidly. By 2030 its arsenal is expected to reach 1,000 nuclear warheads, up from 200 in 2019. This is a particular headache for the US, which views China as its primary rival. But Europeans should also be concerned.
China’s buildup impacts treaty-based arms control globally and threatens the European security architecture, as it reinforces the US strategic disengagement from Europe and casts doubt on the reliability of the US commitments to its allies across the Atlantic.
Given the serious consequences, initiating confidence-building measures and involving China in arms control may seem an obvious recommendation. However, too little attention is paid to understanding the underlying reasons for China’s nuclear build-up.
Beyond Simple Math
The most common explanation of China’s motives is that aims to counter new US capabilities to ensure its deterrence remains credible. In fact, the ongoing development of US nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities has decisively shaped China’s strategic thinking.
In particular, the enhanced precision of nuclear weapons, the expansion of missile defence and the withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019 have caused concern in Beijing. The increasing US surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities could further exacerbate the vulnerability of Chinese nuclear weapons.
However, the technical argument rooted in the security dilemma alone is only partly sufficient to explain the acceleration of Chinese armament. US efforts to expand its capabilities in recent years have been gradual and predictable.
The erratic growth on the Chinese side (with the construction of several Intercontinental Ballistic Missile silo fields) does not align with this pattern. While Russia has developed innovative missile technologies to evade US defences, China has followed a more conventional path, surprising even Chinese nuclear experts.
Missiles and Mindsets
If the military-technical reasons are inadequate, it is evident to look for reasons at the political level. Xi Jinping has played a decisive role in shaping China’s course in recent years. It is well known that Xi leans towards structural realism in foreign policy. Consequently, he is convinced that the US will not cede its leadership role to China without encountering increasing resistance.
The Chinese leadership believes that the US will seek to disrupt the transition as much as possible, resorting to increasingly extreme means. Accordingly, Beijing believes it must have the leading strategic capabilities to force the US and its allies to accept China’s rise. The belief that one’s interests can only be defended through material power, rather than through institutions, rules or norms ultimately explains the expansion of the nuclear arsenal. It is no coincidence that Chinese experts have repeatedly praised Russia’s modernisation of its nuclear arsenal.
Learning from Moscow
The rapid expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal must be understood within the broader context of the country’s ambitions in other areas. China thus needs to position itself more prominently as a nuclear power than in the past. Ironically, the promotion of its nuclear triad – comprising land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers – is precisely what China has criticised as hegemonic behaviour in the past.
With Chinese nuclear policy experts increasingly isolated, their policy is becoming increasingly incoherent, and the People’s Liberation Army is showing strong interest in developing escalation management capabilities, partly driven by the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait. China has closely observed Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling in Ukraine and noted how it has weakened Western support for Ukraine.
Old Rules, New Realities
Against this background, it can be concluded that current efforts to engage China in arms control are unlikely to yield positive results. This is because they solely concentrate on joint military restraint without addressing the underlying causes. Europe, too, must realise that the era of China’s minimal deterrence has come to an end. Only a dialogue that addresses the structural factors of insecurity can be effective; the discovery of the missile silos in 2021 was likely more than just a sensational headline, it may signify the end of a decade-long era.
This text was produced as part of the GenA Fellowship of the Asia Society Switzerland.
