From a Single Umbrella to Multiple Partners

The « Mecca Defence Alliance » between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan represents an emerging institutionalised collective defence arrangement, with a joint political and defence committee and a Secretary-General. Following an emergency meeting of the Mecca Defence Alliance Strategic Political and Defence Committee in Riyadh on October 5, 2026, a joint statement outlined steps towards implementing its commitments, providing the agreed forces and military capabilities, and ensuring their rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. It also affirmed that the security of each member state forms part of the collective security of all three.
On October 7, Reuters reported that Turkey had begun sending defence and technical support to Saudi Arabia against the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen. Taken together, these developments suggest that the alliance is beginning to acquire an operational dimension, moving beyond political commitments towards practical defence cooperation.

A New Security Order or Diverging Security Networks?

In a parallel development, Israel sent Iron Dome batteries and operating personnel to the UAE in May 2026 to help defend against Iranian attacks, according to U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee. Moreover, that month, the UAE and India signed a strategic defence partnership.
The timing of this development alongside Saudi Arabia’s participation with Pakistan in the « Mecca Defence Alliance » reveals another paradox. Saudi Arabia is strengthening its security partnership with Pakistan, while the UAE is deepening its defence cooperation with India. Yet India and Pakistan are nuclear powers with a strategic rivalry marked by wars and repeated military confrontations. The picture becomes more complex amid Turkish-Israeli tensions over competing security interests and military influence in Syria, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE maintain good relations with Syria’s transitional government, in contrast to their relations with Assad’s regime. These overlapping relationships suggest that diversifying Gulf defence partnerships does not necessarily reflect clear regional alignments or produce a shared security vision.
The divergence between Saudi and Emirati security partnerships reflects broader differences in strategic outlooks and national security priorities, particularly regarding Yemen and relations with Israel. While Riyadh and Abu Dhabi share an interest in countering the Iranian threat, this does not necessarily mean they agree on the kind of security order that should govern the region.
Diversifying defence partnerships could expand access to military support and defence technologies while reducing dependence on Washington. However, in the absence of a more integrated Gulf security order, diverging interests among external partners could complicate a coordinated response to major regional security threats and weaken collective deterrence.
What is emerging in the Gulf is therefore not yet a coherent new Gulf security order, but rather a network of overlapping security arrangements marked by both cooperation and competition.

And Where Does Iran Fit?

Iran’s place remains a central dilemma in the future of Gulf security. On the one hand, security concerns are pushing Gulf states to strengthen their defence capabilities. On the other hand, it is difficult to envision long-term regional stability based on excluding Iran or confronting it indefinitely.
The challenge for Gulf states may therefore lie in combining deterrence with dialogue: maintaining the capacity to protect their security and interests while engaging with Iran to reduce tensions and explore the foundations for peaceful coexistence, thereby reducing the risk of confrontations between Iran and its adversaries becoming a direct threat to the security of Gulf states.

Towards a More Integrated Gulf Security Order

The next phase requires Gulf states to pursue a more integrated security order based on shared interests and common threats. This would require closer coordination within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on external defence partnerships, alongside more effective joint mechanisms for responding to security crises.
These developments have implications far beyond the Gulf. Given the region’s strategic importance to global energy supplies and international trade, instability could disrupt energy markets, supply chains and trade routes, affecting economies worldwide, including Switzerland’s. A more stable and coordinated Gulf security order is therefore not only a regional priority but also a matter of international concern.